The Next Brexit debate

Ten years ago, British politics revolved around a single question: should the UK remain in the European Union? The referendum produced two competing visions of Britain’s future. The Leave campaign argued that Brexit would restore sovereignty, allow Britain to “take back control” of its laws and borders, and unlock new economic opportunities beyond Europe. Remain campaigners countered that leaving would damage trade and weaken Britain’s international influence. That argument appeared settled when Britain formally left the EU in 2020. Yet today another question is quietly returning to public debate: should Britain go back?

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Not immediately, and certainly not with the urgency that some pro-European groups such as European Movement UK or the Rejoin EU campaign would like. But the political landscape is shifting. Recent polling suggests around 55% of Britons now support rejoining the EU, while support among younger voters is dramatically higher, with more than four in five Gen Z voters favouring closer European integration or eventual re-entry.

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Politicians are beginning to acknowledge that shift. Speaking in September 2025, current Prime Minister Andy Burnham said he hoped to see Britain rejoin the EU in his lifetime. Keir Starmer increasingly spoke about the need to build a “closer, more mature relationship” with Britain’s European neighbours. Neither position amounts to an argument for immediate accession, but both are a move in the right direction.

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Legally, there is little standing in Britain’s way. Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, any European state that satisfies the Copenhagen criteria may apply for membership. The United Kingdom would follow exactly the same accession process as any applicant. However, the obstacle has never been law. It is politics.

A common misconception is that rejoining would simply restore the relationship Britain voluntarily abandoned in 2020. It would do nothing of the sort. The United Kingdom left as one of the EU’s most heavily opt-out members. It retained the pound, remained outside the Schengen Area, benefited from the British budget rebate and secured numerous exemptions from policies that applied elsewhere across the Union. Those concessions were the product of decades of negotiations. There is little appetite in Brussels for recreating that arrangement. From the perspective of many European governments, Britain’s semi-detached membership often proved as frustrating as it was exceptional. If Britain were to return, it would almost certainly do so on the Union’s standard terms rather than through another bespoke settlement. That would likely mean joining Schengen unless a new exemption could somehow be negotiated and contributing to the EU budget without the rebate it once enjoyed.

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None of that necessarily weakens the case for rejoining. In fact, the economic argument has become stronger since Brexit. Most assessments conclude that Brexit has imposed a lasting cost on the British economy. Estimates suggest UK GDP is around 6-8% lower than it would otherwise have been, business investment has fallen by 12-18%, and productivity has declined by 3-4% as companies have faced new regulatory barriers and higher trading costs. If the question were purely economic, the conclusion would appear relatively straightforward. Closer integration with the EU would improve long-term growth prospects.

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It is tempting to reduce Brexit to an economic calculation. That misses why the referendum produced such a decisive political rupture. For many Leave voters, the issue was never primarily about growth or trade; it was about control, identity and self-government. If Britain is ever to reverse that decision, it will need to address those concerns rather than assume changing economic circumstances have settled the argument.

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Nor should changing opinion be mistaken for a settled consensus. Polls may now show a majority in favour of rejoining, but that support is relative and remains far less rooted than the divisions of the 2016 referendum. A decision as significant as EU membership cannot rest on a narrow polling advantage alone. If Britain is to reopen the question, it must do so from a position of widespread agreement rather than the hope that today’s majority will survive tomorrow’s headlines.

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The same caution appears on the other side of the Channel. Rejoining is often discussed in Britain as though it were entirely our own decision, but it is not. Every existing member state would have to approve British accession unanimously, and they would be doing so at a time when the EU is focused on enlargement and economic competitiveness. Having spent years adapting to Britain’s departure, European governments may hesitate with their support unless they are convinced the UK intends to be a committed, long-term member rather than an awkward partner seeking another bespoke arrangement.

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That is why the current direction of travel is more encouraging than calls for an immediate application. Instead of attempting to settle the membership question overnight, Britain and the EU have begun rebuilding trust through practical cooperation. The UK has joined Horizon Europe and worked with Brussels to ease some of the trade frictions created by Brexit. These changes are modest compared with the drama of the referendum years, but they have done more to improve the relationship than other round of constitutional arguments ever could.

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Perhaps this is exactly how any future return should begin. If Britain is ever to become a member of the EU again, it must first demonstrate that the politics which produced Brexit have genuinely changed, not simply that opinion polls have drifted in a different direction after a difficult decade. Equally, it must persuade its European partners that it is prepared to participate fully in the Union rather than negotiate the exceptional status it once enjoyed.

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Britain may well rejoin the EU one day. Demographic trends suggest attitudes towards Europe will continue to evolve, and the economic case for closer integration is unlikely to weaken. But there is a distinction between believing re-entry is a plausible long-term destination and arguing that is should begin now. For the moment, rebuilding trust is more important than rebuilding membership. Britain’s relationship with Europe is improving precisely because it is no longer dominated by existential arguments about leaving or rejoining. Sometimes the most effective way to move closer is not to rush towards the finish line, but to recognise that there are still several miles left to travel.