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Image: independent.co.uk

By William Collinson

July 13, 2026 • 12 min read

How Will Burnham Deal With Trump?

The question of how to conduct British foreign policy today is tied inextricably to the question of how to deal with US President Donald Trump. This is something that the next prime minister, shorthand for Andy Burnham MP for Makerfield, will have to confront. How will he approach an issue so central to Britain's security and international standing? So far, he has given some contradictory signals, which is cause for concern.  

 

Burnham and Trump are polar opposites, with the latter describing the former as an ‘extremely liberal’ mayor from ‘some town’. Indeed, Burnham has made it part of his proposal to the constituents of Makerfield and thus the UK public to combat the very politics that Trump practices and supports globally: populist right-wing politics, nativism and widening polarisation. This indicates a firmer stance on Trump. Equally, however, Burnham has made it clear that he wants to focus more on domestic issues as prime minister, something that may be incompatible with notions of standing up to Trump. Sticking your head in the sand is not effective foreign policy concerning the US President, something Trump would spot as a sign of weakness, and of Burnham backing down. This personal relationship is something he must get right, and Burnham can do this by striking a balance between two distinct approaches that we will outline.  

Scrambling on the Floor

Sir Kier Starmer – as you are likely sick of hearing by now – was a woefully unpopular prime minister. A few moments of respite came when he struck the right balance with Trump. In a joint press conference following the pair's first face-to-face meeting, Trump suggested Starmer was a “very tough negotiator” and a “special person”.This initial meeting was hailed as a success in the UK, with Starmer's net favourability score rising by 15 points as a result (YouGov). Furthermore, when Starmer initially stood up to Trump at the start of his war on Iran, by refusing to allow UK bases to be used by American aircraft, he was widely praised for keeping the UK out of the war. This remains one of his self-proclaimed great achievements in office: keeping Britain out of war. Despite this, he caved, eventually allowing the US Air Force to use UK bases for ‘collective self-defence'. This saw his popularity drop even further – with 47% of those polled saying Starmer had managed the Iran war badly, showing how damaging an image of cowardice regarding Trump has been for Starmer (YouGov).  

 

One of the most visceral scenes of Starmer's premiership is when Trump dropped some documents regarding a fresh UK-US trade deal on the floor, with Starmer rushing to his knees to pick them up. The imagery was humiliating, and encapsulated where the Starmer-Trump relationship eventually reached. An image of servitude is all that mattered; disregard notions of politeness or general decency. When working with Mr Trump, these virtues are simply signs of weakness.  

 

Starmer avoided ideological or personal confrontations, preferring personal diplomacy and a characteristic pragmatic approach. He refused to fully lock horns with the president as many other international leaders, such as Giorgia Meloni of Italy, have done, and through this approach, he lost power, respectability and influence. The maintenance of the ‘special relationship’ was placed in pole position – a worthy approach – yet the relationship between two nations cannot be reduced to the relationship between two leaders. Ties go deeper than that, and respectful disagreement is fundamental for such close international relationships to thrive. A relationship without room for honest disagreement is incredibly damaging, largely for the weaker partner. Perhaps Burnham will be able to remedy this.  

 

Starmer grasped this requirement initially, and during the early stages of the Iran war. However, he buckled under pressure from Trump frequently, feeling the weight of the ‘special relationship’ on his back. He paid dearly for this, with his deteriorating relationship with the President, his domestic popularity and most importantly, his shattered image. The scene of Starmer scrambling around President Trump's feet, alongside many other examples, created an air of weakness that Trump thought he could exploit. Equally, Trump clearly lost respect for Starmer's capabilities, shocked at the Prime Minister's lack of autocratic control over his military during the Iran war. Burnham must study Starmer’s mistakes and take a different approach. Not least for the health of a relationship with the United States, but for his own electoral fortunes. Having been so vocal on fighting right-wing populism and stopping American-style politics from drifting into the UK, he has far less scope than Starmer to appease Trump. He, rightfully, must be more confrontational.  

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Image: irishstar.com

Can Burnham Look to Canada? 

Despite initial hopes, Starmer’s approach to Trump – and therefore his wider foreign policy approach – widely failed. The so-called ‘special relationship’ is in a rut andStarmer’s reputation as a statesman has fallen from respectability to humiliation. This has greatly damaged him domestically. How have other comparable world leaders interacted with Trump, specifically on his threats of tariff imposition and his ambiguity over international security commitments? The most obvious case would be that of Mark Carney and Canada. There are obvious parallels between the UK and Canada in this instance, and Burnham should take note.  

 

For all the discourse in the UK about our relationship with the US being our chief foreign policy issue, we are comparatively less reliant upon the States. Approximately ¾ of Canadian merchandise exports going to the US, a stark indicator of how intertwined these neighbouring economies are. The UK, by contrast, is less economically interdependent with the US, despite having an especially close trading relationship regarding services. Yet Canada under Carney was far more confrontational, with a lot more to lose economically. Retaliatory tariffs from Canada sparked fears of an economic calamity; the reality has been far less apocalyptic. The country's GDP has shrunk by 0.1% over a year from the 27th  of June, and is in a technical recession following two consecutive quarters of falling GDP, yet this economic slowdown has not been catastrophic as some feared. The labour market remains resilient, inflation has remained under control, and, importantly, Canada has increasingly diversified its trade, signing the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with the EU.  

 

This is a gaping hole in the Trumpian tariff-based project; international markets will be initially affected, but over time they will morph around American trade unpredictability, reducing US influence and control. While Canada has been somewhat hit economically, Carney and Canada have benefited politically. Evidently, stark political duelling with Trump does not necessarily translate to a decimated economy. Britain’s economy is less reliant on the US, proving there is room for a harder stance towards the trump administration where the UK’s economy would not be reduced to a backwater. Hysterical fears of damage to the ‘special relationship’ hamstrung Starmer; Burnham has signalled this could change.   

 

Carney was elected on an anti-Trump message in Canada in 2025. Indeed, distinct from most democratic leaders in the modern Western world, Carney has maintained a net positive approval rating. This is largely due to his steady and strong leadership during times of global flux, caused in large part for Canada by itsneighbo urs to the south. Indeed, Carney’s leadership has lifted Canada’s global standing to that of one of the leading ‘middle powers’, a phrase coined by the Canadian Prime Minister. Carney’s domestic political gains from confronting Trump have also been translated into an improved international status for Canada as a whole.  

 

What can the British government learn from this? Firstly, it must be noted that the UK and Canada are not directly comparable regarding the issue of Trump and the USA. Canada is more economically intertwined with the US, the UK has a nuclear deterrent that is reliant in totality upon the US, and Trump has directly threatened the sovereignty of Canada, to name just a few important distinctions. These are nuances that mean the Carney blueprint is not one that can be implemented completely by Burnham; Trump’s proposals for Canada becoming the 51st state provided Carney with ample justification for retaliation and stark confrontation. Burnham doesn't have this, thankfully, as having the strongest nation on the planet threatening your sovereignty is something best avoided. Check page 2 of the ‘How to be Prime Minister’ handbook. He does, however, have plenty more evidence of the merits of a stronger approach to Trump than Starmer had at his disposal, with 2 years of global examples to pick and choose from since Trump’s re-election in late 2024. He should heed this advice, with a pinch of salt.  




The PM for Makerfield 

When this moment of flux for the world order is considered, and Britain’s need to fashion itself a new position on the global stage is increasingly stark, the prospect of the Prime Minister for Makerfield is instantly less appealing. Pledges to be a domestic prime minister may be incompatible with being more confrontational with Trump. At some point, Burnham will have to choose which path to prioritise, which will make his approach to the alternative path less effective.  There are certainly huge domestic challenges facing the UK, and having a prime minister focused on solving structural issues binding Britain's potential is a great change with vast potential to succeed. Yet it is not enough. Perhaps Burnham took his revolt south for the relatively lesser role of Chancellor of the Exchequer. Perhaps Starmer just jumped the gun wishing instead to focus on his 5-a-side career? Eventually, Burnham will have to turn to foreign policy, and therein, to Mr Trump. This, however, will not be his priority, and therefore will likely not be his success.  

 

There are clear trade-offs for Burnham in this instance. Burnham, more than most politicians, people pleasing. The chief example of this is his economic romanticism on the topic of reindustrialisation, a promise that is emotive for many but practically difficult to follow through on. A policy on Trump may strike a similar tone. Trump is pretty much universally disliked in the UK, with a whopping 73% of people polled holding an unfavourable view of the US President. Standing up to Trump would be an incredibly popular thing for Burnham to do. Equally, Burnham’s current message of focusing on domestic politics has struck a chord with the British public and has forged a sense of optimism from the progressive side of British politics for the first time in years. Pivoting and looking to foreign affairs as Starmer did could be seen as a betrayal. This could help build the narrative that Burnham is just a northern Starmer with a black t-shirt.  

 

Trump respects power, and the relatively brutal way Burnham seized it could be sold well to Trump, providing Burnham a position of respectability and an image of power and strength which Starmer never truly possessed. Trump could acknowledge Burnham's impressive rise to power, and therefore understand a firmer approach from the UK is imminent. Indeed, the former Manchester Mayor’s campaign in Makerfield stressed the importance of fighting a drift of populist right politics from the US into the UK. Perhaps this indicates a realisation from Burnham’s camp that his movement is the last chance before the UK slips towards a right-wing populist government, or perhaps it indicates that Burnham will stand taller under fire from Trump.  

How Far Does Burnham Go?  

It clearly would be a strong electoral strategy to be firmer with Trump. There are also significant examples of the political benefits of a more confrontational approach, while the economic negatives appear less cataclysmic than initially predicted. Yet Britain is in a unique position globally, regarding a relationship with the USA. This must always be considered and is the reason why Britain is tied, for the foreseeable future, to a nation that is increasingly drifting away in terms of separating democratic values, distinct understandings of the importance of international organisations and commitments such as NATO and, from Britain's end, the severance of an influential link to the EU.  

 

Britain’s intelligence, security and, most importantly, its nuclear deterrent are tied to the US, a nation with which we are growing increasingly distant. Do we follow the US down its turbulent and dangerous current trajectory, or strike out in a different direction to build strategic autonomy? These are central questions to Britain’s future, yet they are not questions that can be answered by Burnham in the coming years. Without his own mandate, and without significant time and planning around any new trajectory, Burnham cannot take Britain down a different path internationally. 

 

The UK’s unique position of limbo restricts it, relative to comparable international leaders, from confronting the US administration to a certain extent. The aforementioned requirement for respectful disagreement, required for a functioning international relationship, is something this Trump administration finds incompatible with its America First agenda. The fact that Starmer’s justified refusal to allow US use of British bases in an assault on Iran sparked fury in Washington, with calls to relegate Britain from its pole position as America's top ally, is evidence for this. Burnham must pursue a tougher stance on the US president, bearing in mind the importance of maintaining a strong image which holds great importance regarding Trump, yet his constraints must be understood. Understood by Burnham’s government, and more importantly, the electorate. Burnham can ill afford to mis-sell the extent to which he can stand up to Trump, and the electorate must learn to temper its expectations. Decades of over-reliance upon the US have tied his hands, to an extent, and Britain needs time it scarcely has to rectify this.  

Take a Stance, Any Stance

The future of the ‘special relationship’ is looking increasingly bleak, largely for the fortunes of Britain, the junior partner. The relationship between the Prime Minister and the President is not the culmination of such a close tie, and Burnham must recognise this by pursuing a harder line on the USA under Trump. There are international examples for Burnham to follow, and once he finds his feet, a direction will emerge. This will constitute an early trade-off Burnham will have to make: to take a visibly new stance on Trump or maintain his pious image of total domestic focus.  

 

It would be a mistake to choose to focus on international issues – largely Trump – from the start of his Premiership. However, clearly the British government must change its stance on Trump, a stance that caused Starmer great political wounds whilst the economic gains bought by compliance, have remained wholly negligible. Burnham must strike an uneasy balance between standing firmer against President Trump and maintaining Britain’s vital intelligence, security and nuclear ties with the US. What we have seen, however, is a virtual radio silence on Burnham’s take on this issue. Fear of sparking debate suggests a fear of losing it, perhaps pointing to a weak argument. One would hope Burnham is simply holding his cards close to his chest, yet from an outside perspective, a worrying correlation emerges. You would have thought Labour had learnt this lesson from the 2024 general election. From what we can see, Burnham has not.  

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