democracy is popular. voting isn't.

Declining electoral participation does not necessarily signal declining support for democracy, as the factors that shape whether citizens vote extend beyond their commitment to democratic principles. The following article views turnout as a behavioural outcome shaped by mediating factors such as satisfaction/dissatisfaction with democratic performance,  perceived political efficacy, electoral choice, institutional designs, costs of participation and many other broader contextual factors that may vary across countries. This is demonstrated through two contrasting country cases: the United Kingdom and Switzerland. 

 

The United Kingdom illustrates the first causal pathway: turnout can decline when citizens continue to support democracy in principle but become dissatisfied with how democratic institutions perform in practice. Scholars such as Ezrow and Xezonakis (2016:3) often argue that there is a clear relationship between satisfaction and turnout - usually dissatisfaction signals engagement with the political process because it generates a demand for change in the electorate, which enhances turnout. However, if over time aggregate dissatisfaction with democracy decreases, it could also indicate a lack of trust or fulfilment with the democratic process, as voting in elections can no longer be seen as an effective way of communicating one’s political preferences. This is because ballots act as an expression of satisfaction with democratic institutions, as well as a safety mechanism through which citizens can respond to rising discontent. This reflects dissatisfaction with the functioning of the democratic system rather than a rejection of democracy itself.  

 

This performance-based explanation becomes particularly visible after the late 2000s, when events such as the 2009 Westminster expenses scandal -where some MPs were found to be using public funds for personal expenses (Norris, 2012:61)- alongside failure to produce appropriate policy to tackle the ongoing economic recession. During that time, this scandal significantly eroded political trust in government. Survey data from the British Social Attitudes study (2010) shows that the proportion of citizens who trusted the government to prioritise national interests over party interests fell sharply, from 29% in 2007 to just 16% in 2009. This growing disillusionment was accompanied by a decline in satisfaction with democracy, which dropped to 58% in 2009, and was reflected in relatively low electoral turnout. Participation fell to 61% in 2005 and only slightly recovered to 65% in 2010, well below earlier highs such as  78% in 1992 (IDEA, 2026). It felt as if many voters had fallen out of love with politics,  with dissatisfaction stemming from distrust in how domestic politics was being practised.  

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Mistrust of government alone does not fully explain this case of declining turnout. It is compounded by a perceived lack of meaningful ideological choice, which further reduces the incentive to vote. In the United Kingdom, the ideological convergence of major political parties, particularly Labour’s gradual shift towards neoliberalism and its acceptance of policies associated with Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, blurred the distinction between the two parties. This convergence intensified under the leadership of Tony Blair from  1994 onwards, as Labour embraced free-market policies. The British Social Attitudes study  (2010) finds that by 2005, 44% of British citizens believed there was little difference between  Labour and the Conservatives, representing a sharp increase from previous decades. As a result,  voters increasingly perceived elections as offering limited alternatives, reinforcing the belief that participation would not lead to meaningful policy or economic change. This reflects that when voting no longer connects individuals to distinct political outcomes, its perceived value diminishes. Therefore, declining turnout often reflects not only dissatisfaction with democratic performance but also a weakening of political representation, contributing to the growing disconnect between support for democracy and electoral participation.  

 

Crucially, the UK case also shows why low turnout is not directly linked to support for democracy. Rather, it reflects a divergence between democratic ideals and the perceived performance of political institutions. For example, during the 1960s-1990s, citizens in post-industrial societies became increasingly detached from political parties, more sceptical toward governing elites and institutions, and less confident in parliaments. Yet, evidence from cross-national surveys conducted by author Russell J. Dalton shows that public commitment to democratic principles was not flagged. This is because older liberal democracies such as the UK continue to display strong normative support for democracy as a system of governance (cited in Norris, 2012:103). Moreover, democratic culture has deep-seated roots that have grown over centuries in older liberal democracies such as the UK, which makes the system resilient in times of dissatisfaction. Socialisation theorist Pippa Norris (2012:99)  explains that citizens gradually internalise democratic norms, values, and practices through their environment during their formative years. Over time, this produces a reciprocal relationship: a strong democratic culture enhances the stability and legitimacy of institutions,  while the continued functioning of those institutions reinforces citizens’ commitment to democratic ideals. Consequently, long-established democracies tend to exhibit more robust democratic cultures, as their historical continuity provides a broad foundation of public legitimacy. This is supported by data from the World Values Survey (2005, cited in Norris,  2012:110–111), which found that British citizens rated the importance of living in a democracy at 8.6 out of 10. 

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Yet evaluations of how democracy operates in practice are notably lower. Norris (2012:110)  characterises this situation as a “democratic deficit, where the citizen's expectation from democracy (their aspirations and values) continues to outpace the perceived supply of democracy (how well they believe their government is actually performing). For example, in the UK, satisfaction with democratic performance was recorded at 6.4, creating a net deficit of  −2.2 (Norris, 2012:111). This imbalance between democratic aspirations and perceived delivery helps explain why citizens may continue to endorse democracy as a system of governance while becoming less inclined to participate electorally. In this context, declining turnout reflects dissatisfaction with democratic performance rather than rejection of democracy itself. 

 

Switzerland provides a profound contrast to the UK case, because it shows that low turnout can also emerge under conditions of high satisfaction, not only dissatisfaction. This strengthens the central argument of this essay: electoral participation is not directly related to democratic support but is mediated by the institutional and motivational context in which voting takes place. According to OECD (2024:2) data, 62% of Swiss citizens report high or moderately high trust in the federal government - well above the OECD average of 39% - alongside high levels of satisfaction with public services and a strong sense of political voice. 

 

This high level of trust is closely linked to Switzerland’s system of direct democracy, which enables citizens to participate in policymaking beyond recurring elections. Between 2011 and  2020, an outstanding number of 77 referendums were held, allowing citizens to vote directly on issues such as taxation, healthcare, and infrastructure. Moreover, the popular initiative allows any other group outside the parliament to put a proposal on the table. Citizens of any background may suggest a constitutional amendment by collecting 100,000 signatures within 18 months, while the government may respond with counter-proposals (Swissinfo.ch, 2003).  Additionally, unlike the UK, Swiss voters generally do not feel a lack of ideological choice, as  Switzerland has a highly polarised, multi-party system with distinct, opposing options ranging from the conservative right to the social-democratic left. These mechanisms enhance the sense of instrumental influence over political outcomes, which subsequently strengthens trust and satisfaction with the system. 

 

Yet the same institutions that strengthen democratic satisfaction can also reduce electoral participation, which helps explain why high democratic satisfaction does not automatically translate into high electoral turnout. In Switzerland, citizens perceive referendums as a more consequential form of political participation than elections. As Franklin (2004, cited in Blais,  2014:526) argues, “the devaluing of parliamentary elections… was exacerbated by the increasing use of referendums”. This is because referendums allow citizens to directly express policy preferences without electing representatives. Moreover, the possibility of referenda compels legislators and governments to pay closer attention to their constituents’ views (Blais,  2014:523), thereby, citizens perceive that more meaningful decisions are usually made through referendums, rather than elections. Additionally, Switzerland’s political parties have a tendency to make executive power-sharing agreements, in which major parties ensure the executive remains largely static regardless of election outcomes. This turns voters further away from elections, fostering a sense of futility as if "citizens’ votes have no consequence on which parties will form the government" (Blais, 2014:520). Therefore, referendums greatly contribute to the gap in Swiss electoral turnout. Furthermore, Blais(2014:526) argues that the frequency of referendums increases the cognitive and time costs, generating “voter fatigue”- whereby citizens become disengaged from political participation overall, due to its constant demands.  Empirical evidence supports this, as Switzerland stands out as an extreme outlier in terms of turnout, which is estimated to be around 35 percentage points lower than expected for an established proportional representation system (Blais, 2014:520). Recent federal elections in  2023 have seen participation rates of around 42% of eligible voters, representing a long-term decline from historical highs of 81% in 1933(IDEA, 2026) - further illustrating the uneven and selective nature of participation.  

 

This sustained pattern of low turnout, despite Switzerland’s advanced democratic institutions,  reinforces the claim that declining electoral participation cannot be explained by weak democratic support alone, but instead needs several other reinforcing mechanisms. More specifically, electoral participation declines not because citizens reject democracy, but because the incentives to participate are reduced. The following normative analysis solidifies this claim.  Drawing on Easton’s (1975:444) distinction between diffuse and specific support, citizens may retain a “reservoir of favourable attitudes” towards democratic principles even when they do not actively participate in electoral processes, allowing high support for democracy to coexist with low voter turnout. Linde and Ekman (2003:391) further argue that satisfaction with democracy reflects evaluations of regime performance rather than support for democratic principles, meaning that high satisfaction may reduce the perceived urgency of participation without undermining democratic legitimacy. Additionally, Ezrow and Xenonakis contribute  (2016:4), over-time increases in satisfaction with democracy are associated with decreases in voter turnout; when citizens feel well represented and satisfied with democratic performance,  they no longer desire a change that would strongly motivate them for electoral participation;  therefore, the perceived necessity of voting diminishes. 

 

Altogether, the Swiss case demonstrates that declining electoral participation can coexist with exceptionally high support for democracy, because turnout depends less on support for democracy itself than on contextual factors such as reduced electoral stakes arising from high satisfaction with democracy and voter fatigue arising from frequent expectations of participation, which reduce both the perceived importance and necessity of electoral participation. Alternatively, the UK case shows that declining electoral participation can coexist with high support for democracy, but because of an entirely different set of contextual factors, such as political mistrust and a perceived lack of ideological choice, which weaken citizens’ belief that elections offer meaningful influence over political outcomes, thereby diminishing their perceived incentive to vote.  

 

This comparison carries a broader purpose: it demonstrates that turnout cannot be used as a reliable proxy for democratic legitimacy, since both rising dissatisfaction (UK) and rising satisfaction (Switzerland) can independently suppress participation through entirely different causal mechanisms. This has important implications for how democracies are evaluated:  policymakers and scholars who treat low turnout as a uniform warning sign of democratic decline risk misdiagnosing its causes and consequently prescribing the wrong remedies - such as institutional reform where the real issue is voter fatigue, or vice versa. Recognising this divergence therefore calls for a more context-sensitive approach to democratic health, one that examines the specific mediating conditions within each system rather than relying on turnout figures alone.